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source of wealth and the true measure of value. . . . His doctrine was essentially the doctrine of industrial liberty with which Smith's name is identified, and in view of the claims set up on behalf of the French physiocrats that Smith learnt that doctrine in their school, it is right to remember that he was brought into contact with it in Hutchinson's class-room at Glasgow some twenty years before any of the physiocrats had written a line on the subject, and that the very first ideas on economic subjects which were presented to his mind, contained in germ—and in very active and sufficient germ—the very doctrines about liberty, labor, and value on which his whole system was afterwards built."

The closing sentence of this citation sufficiently indicates Mr. Rae's estimate of the supposed obligations of Adam Smith to the physiocrats. He thoroughly credits Dugald Stewart's evidence that Smith was teaching his class at Glasgow the fundamental principles afterward embodied in the *Wealth of Nations* as early as 1752 or 1753. He vigorously combats the claim of Dupont and others that Adam Smith is to be regarded as in some sort a disciple of Quesnay. Smith, as he puts it, "neither agreed with all the creed of the French economists, nor did he acquire the articles he agreed with from the teaching of their master."

Darwinism and Race Progress. By John Berry Haycraft. (Social Science Series.) London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co.; New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1895. 12mo. pp. xii+180.

The importance of selection in the evolution of human society can of course hardly be overestimated. Until the forces of social selection are understood, but little can be done toward the solution, whether from the theoretical or from the practical side, of the fundamental social problems. The operation of these forces can no longer be so lightly dwelt upon by sociologists as it has often been in the past. On the other hand, the danger now is perhaps that we shall have too hasty and dogmatic an application to social problems of the conclusions—themselves far from being perfectly understood or established—reached by the biologists as to the workings of natural selection in other stages of organic life. Mr. Benjamin Kidd, for example, tells us that it is "an inevitable law of progress amongst the higher forms, that competition and selection must not only accompany progress, but

that they must prevail amongst every form of life that is not actually retrograding. Every successful form must, of necessity, multiply beyond the limits which the average conditions of life comfortably provide Other things being equal, the wider the limits of selection, the keener the rivalry, the more rigid the selection, the greater will be the progress. . . . Nor can there be any doubt that from these strenuous conditions of rivalry the [human] race as a whole is powerless to escape. . . . The races who maintain their places in the van do so on the sternest conditions. These are the stern facts of human life and progress. They result from deepseated physiological causes the operation of which we must always remain powerless to escape." Now the grounds upon which these statements rest—namely, certain specific theories of Professor Weismann are far from being established in the purely biological field; and, even were they so established, such a thoroughgoing application of them to the problems of human society rides roughshod over fundamental distinctions and ignores large possibilities. It is because so much is to be gained by the careful study of selection not merely natural but social, not merely actual but potential, that such premature generalizations as Mr. Kidd's are to be deprecated.

At this juncture the social sciences may well call upon the trained biologist or physiologist to "come over into Sociology and help us." Indeed it is doubtful if any intellectual venture promises larger results than those which might be undertaken by a group of specialists in several departments co-operating in the investigation of the problems of social selection.

This little treatise of a biologist like Haycraft ought therefore to be welcomed on the occasion of its advent into the domain of distinctly sociological literature. It contains little that is absolutely new, being substantially a re-publication in less technical form of a lecture to the Edinburgh Health Society delivered as long ago as 1890. And for the rest, most of the ideas expressed may be found here and there in the literature of the subject. But the volume is nevertheless valuable as a clear, calm, and usually moderate statement of the bearing which the conclusions of biological investigation seem to have upon the momentous problem of the permanent quality of the population.

The author occupies the position—which so far as a layman can judge is rather the prevailing one among biologists—that, whereas the positive theories of Professor Weismann are open to serious objective theories.

tion, the negative side of his doctrine, namely, that characteristics acquired after the birth of the individual are not transmitted to his posterity, is, on the whole, sound. It is interesting to note that Galton anticipated Weismann by about six years in suggesting this view, stating it indeed in the more moderate form in which it is likely perhaps to be substantiated, "that acquired modifications are barely, if at all, inherited in the correct sense of the term."

If this doctrine be sustained, it is evident that the character of population, "and so in large measure the evolution of society," is determined from generation to generation by the forces which determine which family stocks shall increase and which shall relatively decline or absolutely die out. In other words, social progress depends upon natural and social selection.

Purely natural selection, it is sometimes held, has been largely eliminated from advanced human society. This statement is of course wholly superficial. It is true that civilized men are seldom destroyed directly by each other, and still more seldom by animal enemies. They are subject, however, to the ravages of other enemies less obvious, but scarcely less deadly. The micro-organisms of diseases are a powerful selective agency, eliminating large numbers of individuals in spite of all that preventive medicine can do, and allowing to survive those who may be regarded, in one sense of that most ambiguous of expressions, "the fittest to survive." Dr. Haycraft in this connection attempts to discriminate between those diseases on the one hand which attack indiscriminately the well and the sickly, and those on the other which prey almost exclusively upon weak and poor types, holding these latter to subserve, in the absence of preventive or rational selection, the hygienic interests of the race.

The validity of this distinction may perhaps be questioned; it may be held that the so-called "weak and poor type" may be weak and poor simply because it is open to attack from these special enemies, and that if preventive medicine should accomplish its aim of stamping out certain of these diseases the types now subject to them and therefore poor (Dr. Haycraft seems to admit that they may be in some other respects excellent types) might become as desirable as any other type. Or to put the argument in more general form, it may be maintained that "fitness to survive" depends upon the character of the selective agencies of the environment; that the standard of fitness is thus relative, changing as the environment changes.

However this may be, our author's judgment is that on account of preventive hygiene, and sanitary improvements, the race is deteriorating in general constitutional robustness. His remedy is the substitution of conscious social selection. "If individuals of today are to have the advantage of absence of their microscopic foes, the children of the future must not be the sufferers; we must replace the selective influence of the microbe by the selective action of man's forethought, which shall provide that these children shall alone be produced by healthy parents."

A somewhat similar line of argument is followed out with reference to the problems of social selection more properly understood, with an analogous result. The harsher features of selection have been largely removed by the increasing agencies and methods of humane activity. It is necessary to substitute a higher, more far-sighted philanthropy, and to work out a system of selection at once humane and efficient. "If our pity is enlisted on the side of suffering, it must be used to prevent the production of those who are bound to suffer."

The gradual decrease in the proportion of the vicious and incapable, that might be brought about by a general recognition by the present generation of its responsibility to the generations to follow, is only one side of the problem. "There is good reason to believe that the career necessary to individual success in the life-struggle of modern societies is one which carries with it and necessitates relative sterility. It would indeed be difficult to conceive plan more inimical to the future of a race, or better designed to sap the power of a nation, than that of taking from it in perpetuity those possessed of innate capacity, a result which follows when the best citizens are induced, for the sake of gifts and honors, to relinquish their obligation to the race of being the parents of many children." Here as in the opposite aspect of the problem the remedy suggested is the wider recognition of the "one efficient means of improving the race," that of "carrying it on through the best and most worthy strains," and the increasing sense of social obligation.

This summary can do scant justice to Dr. Haycraft's work. Much less can the writer attempt to criticise it. It need only be noted, what no doubt the author himself recognizes, that such radical suggestions of social selection presuppose a fairly definite ideal of human progress. What weight should be given relatively to health, talent, genius, and moral qualities? Does not an adequate answer necessitate the power

to foresee what are to be the future conditions and possibilities of human life on this planet?

C. C. C.

Law in a Free State. By Wordsworth Donisthorpe. London: Macmillan & Co., 1895. 8vo. pp. xii + 312.

The purpose of this recent book, by the author of *Individualism*, is to remedy the fault of other writers of his school who propose indeed to solve all social problems by applying the principle of liberty but who will not or cannot tell us *how* to do it. It is not addressed to philosophical anarchists but to that large body of Englishmen who, though sympathetically inclined, have not yet fully accepted the gospel of liberty. To such the nine chapters are offered as "nut-crackers" to be applied to some of the more difficult problems of the day.

The author's position is that of an advanced individualist, yet not one of the most radical sect. Absolute freedom from state interference is the goal towards which civilization is making, but we "are not yet ripe for complete anarchy, and must have an admixture of something which is not anarchy. That something may be called by any name, but, as a matter of fact, it is socialism" (p. 16). His endorsement of state interference, however, seems limited to "defense of the country, which will be socialistic so long as there is any need for it at all, and the administration of a criminal code, which will remain so until the criminal law is swallowed up by the civil."

An attempt is made to determine the limits of personal liberty, a problem which must be answered whether we adopt despotism or democracy, socialism or anarchy. The principle that freedom is to be allowed, so far as it does not interfere with others, is ruled out on the ground that the solidarity of society makes every act, to some degree, injurious to some one. The acceptance of the will of the majority as a criterion merely begs the question, which is: "How should the majority decide?" The author's solution is that the rule for state action must be derived from the same source as the rule for individual conduct. "We must give up all hope of deducing good laws from high general principles and rest content with those middle principles which originate in expedience" (p. 75). "Our aim should be to find out by study of history what those classes of acts are, in which state interference shows signs of becoming weakened, and as far as possible to hasten on the day of complete freedom in such matters. . . .